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Abstract
This article focuses on the recently increased interest in transnational and translocal regions and 
regionalism in the context of a general “spatial turn” in the social sciences and the humanities. 
Using the historical conceptualizations of “the North” and “the Nordic region” (Norden, Pohjola) as 
an example, the article analyzes the processes of region-building in general and the case of the 
Nordic countries (Scandinavia) as a historical and historiographical region in particular. On the one 
hand, the constructed character of Norden will be acknowledged; on the other, it is also argued 
that the regional constructions may have a certain degree of construct validity and a historical 
continuity, based on common historical experiences and the inherent spatiality of history. Finally, 
the article concludes that the acknowledgement of the transnational framework is important when 
rethinking the history of historiography, albeit it is not necessarily a more “enlightened” alternative 
to methodological nationalism.
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“The Nation Is Dead, Long Live the Region”?
In an article published in 1984, entitled “Die Nation ist tot: Es lebe die 
Region,” the German historian Hans Mommsen questioned the self-evident 
position of the nation-state at the hub of historical research (MOMMSEN 1984). 
Such an interest in a transnational or regional framework was by no means 
new. In the early nineteenth century, the establishment of geography as an 
academic discipline encouraged scholars within cultural sciences to elaborate 
wide-ranging theories about the relationship between human history and 
physical environment, transcending the present state borders. Although the 
growth of historicism in academic historical research diminished the interest in 
the concept of space, which was mainly considered a neutral and passive stage 
for historical actors, the turn of the century saw the “return of space”. Broadly 
speaking, this rehabilitation of the concept of space was boosted by the colonial 
globality of high imperialism which resulted in the invention of new spatially 
oriented academic disciplines such as anthropogeography and geopolitics as 
well as new transnational concepts such as Lebensraum (‘living space’). At the 
same time, pan-Asiatic and pan-Islamic movements developed outside Europe 
to oppose the Eurocentric conception of the global space (SMITH 1991, p. 56–
59, 219–231; CONRAD 2010, p. 60–66).
Nevertheless, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, the late 
nineteenth-century process of globalization was accompanied by the creation 
of new nation-states. Thus, to cite the German historian Sebastian Conrad, 
“global interconnectedness did not so much contribute to the dissolution of 
nation-states, as some contemporary commentators believed, but rather was 
instrumental in constituting them and making them permanent” (CONRAD 2010, 
p. 67). The position of the nation-state as the self-evident spatial unit of history-
writing was further consolidated by the fact that post-WWII social theories 
were particularly interested in modernization, development, and change – in 
other words, in temporality at the expense of spatiality. Indeed, in the German-
speaking academe, even the very word Raum (space) became politically and 
ethically dubious, since geopolitics and the idea of Lebensraum had been used 
during the interwar period as a “scientific” justification for imperialism and 
Nazism with disastrous consequences (SOJA 1989, p. 34–38; SMITH 1991, p. 
232–233). Although regional and transnational perspectives continued to exist 
in the margins of methodological nationalism (for instance, the Annales School 
and Marxist-inspired world-system analyses), there is no doubt that, at least in 
European historiography, the vast majority of historical studies until today has 
firmly resided within the parameters of nation-states. Even when history-writing 
has been conducted under the label of world history, in many cases “the world” 
has still been studied as a mere backdrop for national and civilizational histories 
to understand their formations and dynamics (DIRLIK 2005, p. 395).
This state of affairs has notably altered only from the 1980s onwards. On 
the one hand, boosted by postmodernism and what is known as the linguistic 
turn, the “Orientalist” critique of Edward Said, postcolonialism, and the Subaltern 
studies have posed a profound challenge to European historical methods 
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and analytical categories as well as the alleged “Western idea of history” as 
a whole (e.g. NANDY 1995, p. 44–46, 53–54, 63). On the other hand, the 
practitioners of world history or global history1 have emphasized the entangled 
and interconnected history of “the West and the rest”. For instance, the historian 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam has used historiographical examples from Mexico, the 
Mughal empire, and the Ottoman domains to show that there is no such thing 
as a “European” or “Western” historical consciousness, since the past traditions 
of history-writing have developed within diverse processes of engagement and 
supralocal connections at least since the early modern period. Accordingly, 
he also questions the boundaries defined retrospectively by post-WWII Area 
Studies, arguing that they have blinded us to the possibilities of connection 
(SUBRAHMANYAM 1997, p. 742–748, 759–761; 2005, p. 26–30, 35–36). In a 
similar manner, the world historian Arif Dirlik suggests that we should actually 
supplant the term “transnational” by “translocal”. The latter carries us from the 
conceptual realm of nations to that of places and spaces which have preceded 
in their existence the emergence of nations and are quite likely to outlast the 
nation as we have known it (DIRLIK 2005, p. 397).
In the case of Europe, the post-Communist, post-Maastricht Treaty era is 
manifest in slogans such as “Europe of the regions,” emphasizing its diversity. 
For instance, the fall of the Cold War dichotomy between the Eastern Bloc and 
the Western Bloc has generated the notion of “three historical Europes”: a 
western Europe, a central eastern Europe, and a southeastern Europe, which 
are argued to have their distinctive civilizational heritages and, thus, different 
routes to modernity (BLOKKER 2005; DELANTY 2007; TROEBST 2003, p. 183–
185). At the same time, however, the intensified European integration and the 
development of European Union (EU) institutions have fostered the idea of a 
deep-rooted unity of European culture, hoping to establish a shared post-national 
“EUropean” identity. Since both the diversity and unity doctrines have received 
their share of criticism, a third alternative has also emerged, promoting “unity in 
diversity,” in which different layers of allegiance constitute “the multiple identity 
of the contemporary subjects” (e.g. SASSATELLI 2002, p. 435–440).
Moreover, a resurgent, renewed, reinvented, or rediscovered regionality 
has manifested as an interest in sub-national regions within a nation-state 
or crossing national boundaries, such as the lands of the Sámi people, the 
northernmost indigenous people in Europe, which are today divided between four 
different countries (Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). There the regionalist 
emancipation has resulted in the emergence of resistant regional identifications 
and the accusations of “internal colonialism” against “the oppressive center,” 
that is, the nation-states that have advocated the forced integration of the Sámi 
people in the name of “national unity”. The integration process of the European 
Union has accelerated the disintegration of the nation-states through various EU 
1 A conceptual distinction is sometimes made between “world history” and new “global history.” For instance, 
according to the historian Bruce Mazlish, the former is mainly focused on civilizations and historical phenomena 
that arise on a world scale, whereas the latter deals with the processes that transcend the nation-state 
framework, thus entering upon the history of globalization (see e.g. MAZLISH 1998, p. 387, 393). 
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programs that support such sub-national regionalism (See e.g. WINGE 2001, p. 
48; TOIVANEN 2003, p. 206–207, 213–215).
In all cases, the underlying skepticism about national history arguably 
indicates that the development of strong nation-states has reached its zenith 
after 500 years of almost continuous growth, and the past, the present, and 
the future of “Europe” are reconsidered in the regional framework, which does 
not necessarily correspond with the present-day nation-states. Quite often 
the emphasis on a transnational or translocal space has been considered an 
enlightened alternative to “impoverished provincial thinking” and methodological 
nationalism; a moral and intellectual imperative in the suppression of destructive 
(neo-) nationalism and xenophobic tendencies of present-day Europe. As the 
advocates of comparative and transnational histories argue, these approaches 
clearly show that national cases cannot be isolated from others in glorious 
solitude, which raises the question of whether any “national uniqueness” exists 
at all (APPLEGATE 1999, p. 1164; STENIUS 2003, p. 20; BALDWIN 2004, p. 
4–5). The boldest statements argue that the nation-state paradigm has now 
ended once and for all, and the historians should therefore abandon nation- 
-states as outdated sites of historical inquiry (APPLEGATE 1999, p. 1157–1165; 
ARONSSON 2001, p. 14; GREEN 2004, p. 45–46).
As a whole, the rising interest in regionalism seems to be related to the 
new phase of globalization, which, somewhat analogously to the situation of 
one hundred years ago, has been accompanied by a “return of space.” This has 
resulted in a spatial turn in the social sciences and the humanities, which lends 
new importance to the inherent spatiality – or, as some scholars rather prefer to 
say, placiality2 – of human activities. To simplify things slightly, while historians 
have tended to consider history an account of “change over time,” it has been 
argued that they should focus at least equally on “change through space,” that 
is, on the embodied and emplaced nature of our being-in-the-world, which leads 
us to rethink human history as place-bound and place-making. Theoretically, the 
spatial turn is indebted to the critical human geographers such as David Harvey, 
Doreen Massey, and Edward Soja, who have drawn upon a variety of philosophers 
and sociologists from the pragmatic-hermeneutic tradition and phenomenology 
to the Frankfurt School, French poststructuralism, and postcolonial studies. The 
honor of being a path-breaker is often assigned to the Marxist theorist Henri 
Lefebvre, who in his La Production de l’espace (1974) convincingly articulated 
the notion of space as socially produced (ETHINGTON 2007, p. 466–467, 478–
479, 482–483; CASEY 2007, p. 510; ARIAS 2010, p. 29–31).
Because of the significant influence of various “post-isms” on the spatial 
turn (e.g. poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism), this approach 
has challenged such historicist views that regard places, such as nations, regions, 
and territories, as pre-given entities that can be treated in purely empirical, and 
empiricist, terms. On the contrary, it argues that places should be considered to 
2 The philosopher Edward S. Casey, among others, has presumed the importance of the distinction between 
space and place, taking “‘space’ to be the encompassing volumetric void in which things (including human 
beings) are positioned and ‘place’ to be the immediate environment of my lived body” (CASEY 2001, p. 683).
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be in the constant state of “becoming,” produced and reproduced in interaction 
with their surroundings. New spatial conceptualizations may emerge, the old 
ones may acquire new meanings over a period of time, and some may become 
marginal to people’s lives and disappear. In other words, places are not essences 
but processes, rooted in social practices, disciplinary power, and ideology 
(GUSTAFSON 2001, p. 6; ARIAS 2010, p. 30–31; JONES 2011, p. 317–319).
Consequently, there is no reason to postulate that the transnational or 
translocal regions and region-building would be somehow more “natural” 
or “disinterested” than the nations and nation-building. To cite the critical 
geographer David Harvey, “Place, in whatever guise, is like space and time, 
a social construct […] The only interesting question that can then be asked 
is: by what social process(es) is place constructed?” (HARVEY 1996, p. 261). 
Indeed, both in the era of empires and in the era of modern nation-states, the 
construction of diverse meso-regions has been an inseparable part of state- 
-building, which indicates that regionalist, imperial(ist), and nationalist projects 
have been closely interwoven, and these distinctions often collapse when actual 
examples are looked at (APPLEGATE 1999, p. 1164–1165). Thus, a strong 
case can be made for approaching both nations and transnational regions as 
“imagined communities,” the existence of which is preceded by the existence of 
nation-builders and region-builders (NEUMANN 1994, p. 58).
However, while very few historians today would claim that a region or 
a place has a steadfast essence, it is open to debate whether it is possible 
to construct a region as if it was an ex nihilo creation. Radical constructivists 
argue that it is always possible to find some link or pre-history which can be 
used to justify any region-building project, whereas structuralist approaches 
emphasize that a region is seldom a totally arbitrary product. In other words, 
both approaches agree that social, economic, cultural, and political structures 
and traditions in a given transnational or translocal area do not automatically 
and naturally result in the emergence of a supranational regional entity and a 
regional identification. However, the structuralists still argue that some regional 
conceptions may have a certain degree of construct validity and a historical 
continuity, based on common historical experiences, historical memory, or – 
to use Reinhart Koselleck’s concept – a common Erfahrungsraum in the sense 
that the societies that form a region have been founded on similar principles, 
practices, and institutions (GÖTZ 2003a, p. 324–326; STENIUS 2003, p. 21; cf. 
NEUMANN 1994, p. 73).
In this article, I want to argue the case for a moderate region-building 
approach, which acknowledges the “imagined” character of translocal regions, 
yet does not regard them as spatial units that can be constructed on a fully 
arbitrary basis. A prime example of an unsuccessful attempt to construct a 
translocal region is the Finnish interwar interest in an “in-between” Europe 
(Zwischeneurope; Väli-Eurooppa), composed of the new independent small- 
-states after the collapse of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Ottoman 
empires. Although some influential politicians and foreign policy experts did 
their best to promote this transnational entity, the attempt soon came to grief 
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due to the lack of trade relations, common geopolitical interests as well as 
associations and informal networks on the level of civil society (see SAARIKOSKI 
1993, p. 116–120; VARES 2003, p. 248–250, 254–262). As the sociologist 
Anthony Giddens has argued in his theory of structuration, social structures do 
not do anything by themselves; they depend on the actions of human subjects 
in everyday life. Without people who make and remake a certain region on a 
daily basis it will not gain a socio-spatial significance that is necessary for it to 
become institutionalized – no matter how eagerly the regionalist ideas would be 
cherished by some politicians or other elite groups (GIDDENS 1984, p. 2–28; 
see also CRESSWELL 2004, p. 34–39). In other words, there arguably has to be 
a double process of both “social spatialization” and “spatial socialization” before 
a certain population considers themselves to be members of a common spatial 
unit (see PAASI 1996, p. 7–9; MACLEOD 1998, p. 838–839).
A useful theoretical concept in the discussion on a “Europe of the regions” 
is the German term Geschichtsregion (‘history region’ or ‘historical region’), 
which has its origins in the interwar debate on what “Eastern Europe” is. To cite 
the historian Stefan Troebst, in the German sense of the Geschichtsregion, the 
term “stands for the construction of a meso-region which over a long period of 
time is characterized by an individual cluster of social, economic, cultural and 
political structures and which is larger than a single state yet smaller than a 
continent.” Accordingly, a historical region differs from intra-state and inter- 
-state micro-regions (e.g. Bavaria, Bessarabia) as well as from macro-regions 
such as continents, world-systems, civilizations, or hemispheres (e.g. Europe, 
sub-Saharan Africa). As Troebst emphasizes, it is above all a heuristic concept 
for comparative analysis in order to identify transnational or translocal structures 
and features common to a constructed meta-region which is in general not 
congruent with geographical or political boundaries. Thus, it is definitely not to 
be perceived in an essentialist or even geodeterminist way (TROEBST 2003, p. 
173, 177). In my view, this concept is highly useful in the sense that it allows 
us to recognize the constructed character of places and regions, yet without 
treating them as purely imaginary, free-floating signifiers that would appear and 
exist out of nothing.
Norden as a Historical Region
In the discussion on European regions, Norden (the North) or the Nordic 
region – often used as a synonym for Scandinavia in anglophone countries – has 
been presented as a classic example of the Geschichtsregion (TROEBST 2003, 
p. 173; see also HILSON 2008, p. 15). To cite the sociologist Amitai Etzioni, 
“There is no region in Europe and few exist in the world where culture, tradition, 
language, ethnic origin, political structure, and religion – all ‘background’ and 
identitive elements – are as similar as they are in the Nordic region” (ETZIONI 
1965, p. 220–221). By “the Nordic region,” these authors commonly mean the 
five independent states of present-day Northern Europe: Denmark (including 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands as the autonomous parts of the Danish state), 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
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Indeed, one may certainly claim that Norden has been produced and 
reproduced during the centuries through the dynamics of everyday life, routine 
interactions, and constant encounters. As archeological and historical sources 
testify, the present-day Nordic region was gradually interwoven into a tight 
network of economical, social, cultural, and political exchange ever since the Early 
Middle Ages. The most long-lasting political constellation was the Kalmar Union 
(1397–1523) that united Denmark (including present-day Norway, Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands, and Greenland) and Sweden (including the southwestern parts 
of present-day Finland). In a more recent era, common historical structures 
and institutions such as a uniform Lutheran state-church, the highly centralized 
state, the agrarian, pragmatic character of “Nordic Enlightenment,” and the 
relative freedom and early political participation of the land-owning peasants 
have been emphasized as elements that have left their strong imprint on Nordic 
people’s everyday experiences and mentalities (See e.g. GÖTZ 2003a, p. 328–
331; STENIUS 2003, p. 21–23; HILSON 2008, p. 11–17).
However, on a closer look, the concept of Norden has referred to anything 
but a clear-cut geographical entity. Instead, it has been in the constant state of 
becoming. Until the turn of the eighteenth century, in addition to the present-day 
Nordic countries, “the North” of Europe also included northern Poland, northern 
Germany, north-western parts of Russia, the islands of Orkney and Shetland 
as well as the present-day Baltic countries. This broad conception started to 
shrink only during the Age of Enlightenment. As a consequence of the Great 
Northern War (1700–1721), the power balance of Northern Europe had been 
completely shaken: Sweden and Denmark lost their positions as the dominant 
players in the Baltic Sea region to Russia and Prussia. The defeat of Sweden 
against Russia was sealed during the Napoleonic Wars, when Sweden lost the 
eastern third of its remaining realm. This area was incorporated into the Russian 
Empire as the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809. The ideological 
process of “othering” Russia was accelerated by the breakthrough of political 
liberalism and the West-European support for Polish autonomy in the 1830s, 
which degraded Russia to a reactionary regime belonging to “retarded” Eastern 
Europe or “barbarian” Asia. As a result, a more restricted conceptualization 
of Norden was established, separating the present-day Nordic countries both 
from the Slavic Eastern Europe and the Germanic Central Europe (See e.g. 
HENNINGSEN 1997, p. 105–107; ENGMAN; SANDSTRÖM 2004, p. 16–18; on a 
more general level, see also WOLFF 1994.)
Indeed, despite the common Lutheran, agrarian, social, and political 
structures, practices, and traditions, it is fair to say that until the early nineteenth 
century, Denmark and Sweden had been bitter political rivals. Only with the 
Romantic mytho-cultural pan-Scandinavianism, which developed into a political 
pan-Scandinavianism in the early 1830s, the idea of an age-old Nordic unity 
truly made a breakthrough. On the one hand, this transnationalist alternative 
to the nation-state was based on the argument that Norden actually constituted 
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one nation (Volk) united by the common linguistic-cultural heritage,3 values, 
and a shared destiny. On the other hand, pan-Scandinavianism was spurred 
by the attempts to unify the threats of the Danes in the South (Prussia) and 
the Swedes in the East (Russia) into one figure of thought. Only at this point a 
common Nordic past from the Viking Age and the Kalmar Union was constructed 
and elevated to a central position as an evidence for an age-old Nordic (Old 
Norse) identity (ØSTERGÅRD 1997, p. 34–39; STRÅTH 2012, p. 26). As noted by 
the historian Else Roesdahl, even the very terms “Vikings” and the “Viking Age” 
did not exist in their present meaning before the beginning of the nineteenth 
century (ROESDAHL 1998, p. 9–11).
After the failure of political pan-Scandinavianism in 1864, when Sweden- 
-Norway refused to give military aid to Denmark in the Second War of Schleswig 
against Prussia-Austria, pan-Scandinavian visions were replaced by practical 
Scandinavianism or “Nordism”. The idea of a common Nordic identity and past 
remained, but it was now constructed on the basis of the separate nation-states. 
In other words, Nordicity as a meso-regional identity was now built into what 
it meant to be a Dane, Swede, Norwegian, Finn, or Icelander, instead of being 
an addition to the (primary) national identifications. Consequently, the nation- 
-states became the configurations through which Norden manifests itself to the 
point that the present-day nation-states have come to appear as natural entities, 
anachronistically projected onto the older historical periods (STRÅTH 1993, p. 59; 
ØSTERGÅRD 1997, p. 42–46, 58–62; JOENNIEMI; LEHTI 2003, p. 133).
The “Golden Age” of this Nordic cross-national identification was arguably 
the postwar era until the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989–1991. During that 
time, the Nordic countries in general and Sweden in particular were perceived 
as the avant-garde of modernity. In the Nordic welfare state ideology, Norden 
functioned as a demarcation from Europe: a democratic, Protestant, progressive, 
and egalitarian North against a Catholic, conservative, and capitalist Europe as 
well as the communist Eastern Bloc (SØRENSEN; STRÅTH 1997, p. 22; MUSIAŁ 
1998, p. 1–9). In the Cold War environment, the cooperative image of Norden 
was not only a favorite subject of bombastic political speeches. The Nordic 
region was institutionalized, for instance, by the 1952 establishment of the 
Nordic Council as an inter-parliamentary body and the realization of the Nordic 
passport union. These were followed by the joint labor market in 1954 and the 
harmonization of laws, such as the Nordic Convention on Social Security in 
1955. As a result, the Nordic region was not only a socio-spatial unit into which 
its inhabitants were socialized as a part of societal reproduction, but it was also 
a place that provided a geographically specific set of structures that influenced 
the everyday lives of ordinary citizens in very concrete ways. Hence, Norden 
became a “place” in the sense that it also referred to personal experiences 
3 Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish languages all belong to the North German language group. The 
three mainland Nordic languages (Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish) are more or less mutually intelligible. 
Finnish, instead, belongs to the Uralic family of languages, which sets the Finnish-speaking majority of 
Finland linguistically apart from other Nordic countries. However, during the peak of pan-Scandinavianism, the 
educated classes in Finland were still mostly Swedish-speaking or bilingual, so the historical role of different 
languages should not be exaggerated during that period.
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and meanings contained in individual life-histories (On a theoretical level, see 
MACLEOD 1998, p. 838–839). At this point, at the latest, Norden redeemed its 
status both as a “native concept” rooted in everyday language and an analytic 
tool developed by the scholars.
Nevertheless, even during the heyday of sovereign nation-states, Norden 
continued to be a contested and oscillating space. To begin with, since the 
days of pan-Scandinavianism, there had been a terminological tension between 
‘Scandinavia’ and Norden. In this context, ‘Scandinavia’ means a Nordic 
unification and/or cooperation entity without Finland, whereas Norden includes 
Finland (STRÅTH 2005). In Iceland, by contrast, the term ‘Scandinavia’ is often 
used only to denote the Scandinavian Peninsula, that is, Norway and Sweden 
(ÁRNASON; WITTROCK 2012, p. 21–22). Moreover, some scholars have 
distinguished the Atlantic sea-facing Norden (Denmark, Iceland, and Norway) 
from the land-based Baltic Norden (Finland and Sweden). For instance, during 
the Cold War, the former three countries became founding members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whereas Sweden and Finland emphasized 
their neutrality and “the Nordic balance” which anchored Norden between the 
two Blocs – although the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
between Finland and the Soviet Union (1948–1992) certainly had its effects on 
Finnish politics (NEUMANN 1994, p. 62–63; ØSTERGÅRD 1997, p. 70). To some 
extent, these divisions are visible even today, since Norway and Iceland have 
decided to stay outside the European Union, whereas Finland is the only Nordic 
country that is the member of the European Monetary Union (Eurozone).
Furthermore, the late nineteenth century also saw the emergence of a more 
sinister kind of Nordism. In the academic circles, disciplines such as physical 
anthropology, race biology, and comparative anatomy produced sweeping racial 
classifications and typologies, which were further combined with archeological 
and philological findings. When this “scientific” racism was mixed with Old Norse 
mythologies, Social Darwinism, and pan-Germanic ideas of the true, unspoiled 
Germanic peoples of Norden, the result was the idea of a common Aryan/
Germanic/Nordic blood, “the Nordic race,” and its racial superiority. During the Nazi 
regime, this ideological mishmash culminated in “the Nordic idea” (allnordischen 
Gedanken) as the basis of a German-Scandinavian rapprochement (MUSIAŁ 
1998, p. 6–7; WERTHER 2010, p. 70–71). Although the number of convinced 
Nazis was relatively small in the Nordic countries, the amount of Germanophiles 
and Nazi sympathizers was much larger, and after 1933, it was often difficult to 
distinguish these groups from each other (see e.g. HANSSON 2003, p. 191–194). 
Thus, it is safe to say that all Nordic countries had significant, mostly academic 
and military communities that supported close German-Scandinavian cooperation 
on the basis of racial brotherhood. Given the different outcome of the WWII, 
the Aryan/Germanic/Nordic meso-region might have been institutionalized as the 
new transnational identification of Norden (MUSIAŁ 1998, p. 6–7).
Finally, the post-1989 era resulted in at least in two different kinds of region- 
-building projects the Nordic countries, both of which challenged, to some extent, 
the axiomatic position of the nation-states. On the one hand, we can perceive a 
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conceptual enlargement of Norden, promoted above all by the Nordic scholars of 
international relations and geopolitics as the shift “from Nordism to Baltism” and 
“the return of Northernness”. As these slogans indicate, the Nordic countries 
oriented themselves in the 1990s towards the Baltic countries and Northwest 
Russia. A notable element of this reorientation was the restructuring of the 
Nordic Council to advance cooperation with these areas (See e.g. WÆVER 1992, 
p. 101; JOENNIEMI; LEHTI 2003, p. 136–137; BROWNING 2007, p. 41). On the 
other hand, the old idea of the Nordic Federation (Förbundsstaten Norden) has 
been reinvented in order to increase the Nordic influence on the European Union 
as well as to defend the position of the Nordic region in an intensified territorial 
competition that stretches across the whole hierarchy of spatial locales, from 
the smallest locality to the scale of the world economy (WETTERBERG 2010; 
on a general level, see also SOJA 1989, p. 172–173). Although the suggestion 
of “the new Kalmar Union” has been labelled by most Nordic politicians as 
highly unrealistic, it highlights the fact that regional identifications are complex 
processes, and even if the meaning of “the North” might seem to have expanded 
recently, the old idea of Norden as a demarcation from the rest of Europe and, 
especially, from Russia is still lurking in the background (see also BROWNING 
2003, p. 48, 52–57).
Norden as a Historiographical Region
For contemporary historians, it is certainly no news that the academization, 
professionalization, and institutionalization of history as an academic discipline 
proceeded in the nineteenth century hand in hand with the rise of modern 
nationalism. Consequently, it is no news either that the history of Norden or 
the Nordic region has been largely written from the perspective of the separate 
nation-states. This has been the state of art even in research focusing on the 
periods preceding the emergence of the nation-states. For instance, in Swedish 
historiography the idea of a “Sweden proper” emerged after the Napoleonic 
Wars as the core meaning of all Swedish history from the dawn of time, largely 
ignoring the fact that the southwestern part of present-day Finland had been an 
integral part of “original” Sweden ever since its consolidation in the fourteenth 
century – and vice versa, since Finnish historiography has also been eager to 
emphasize the long and glorious past of the Finnish nation (folk) before “the 
Swedish conquest” (ENGMAN 1994; ØSTERGÅRD 1997, p. 58–59). Similarly, 
Norwegian historians have been busy demonstrating the unbroken continuity 
of the history of Norway from the Viking era to the nineteenth century, thereby 
downplaying the significance of “the 400-year-night” during which the country 
had been a part of the Danish Realm. In this connection, it is perhaps needless 
to add that their Danish colleagues, for their part, have only been happy to leave 
Norway to the Norwegians (KIRBY 1991, p. 10–11; ARONSSON et al. 2008, p. 
262). In general, the number of those Nordic historians who have specialized in 
the history of one of their Nordic neighbours has been very small, and in many 
cases, these territorial crossings have been met with harsh criticism by the 
“native” historians (ENGMAN 1991, p. 50–51; TORSTENDAHL 2000, p. 16–17).
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While the tendency to nationalize the past is a common feature in modern 
historiography, in the Nordic case it has been accompanied by a general consensus 
among the professional historians that the present-day Nordic countries 
compose a distinctive historical region (Geschichtsregion) with common social, 
political, economic, and cultural structures and traditions, and thus, Nordic joint 
activities within historical research are justifiable and necessary. As early as 
1905, this conviction resulted in the first Nordic Meeting of Historians (Nordiske 
historikermöte), which during the interwar period developed into a truly inter- 
-Nordic event participated by historians from all five Nordic countries (TORBACKE 
2005, p. 52–56). In Sweden, the interwar period also saw the foundation of the 
historical journal Scandia in 1929. As the founders of Scandia boldly stated, 
“national, political, and religious viewpoints are in contravention of scientific 
principles”. Hence, they looked forward to smoothing the way to a better 
understanding of a common Scandinavian-Nordic heritage; in this case, via a 
rigorous process of source criticism and demand for objectivity (KIRBY 1991, p. 
9; TORSTENDAHL 2000, p. 4).
As I already mentioned in the previous chapter, the postwar era until the 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc was in many ways “the Golden Age” of Nordic cross- 
-national identification and cooperation. Consequently, the cooperation between 
Nordic historians also flourished in an unparalleled way during this period, 
resulting in new inter-Nordic publications, conferences, and research projects. 
Firstly, the common Nordic historiographical public space was reasserted by the 
foundation of Scandinavian Economic History Review in 1953 and Scandinavian 
Journal of History in 1976. When laying out their guidelines, both journals 
emphasized the international nature of their topics, which, in principle, made them 
favourable to comparisons presented in an internationally accessible language. 
As the names of these publications already indicated, this new lingua franca 
was English, contrary to the previous decades when German had been the most 
widely used foreign language of the Nordic historians. However, this tendency 
toward “anglophonizing” the common Nordic historiographical space was not 
always positively received. Although it arguably made the Nordic discussion 
and cooperation easier also for those Finnish-speaking Finns and Icelanders 
to whom Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian were practically foreign languages, 
it was also criticized for isolating academic history-writing from the broader 
Nordic community and weakening the common feeling of Nordicity based on the 
distinctively Nordic linguistic-cultural heritage (ENGMAN 1991, p. 52–53).
Secondly, the increased cooperation was manifested by new inter-Nordic 
seminars and workshops. From 1965 to 1993, Nordic historians gathered around 
the regular meetings of the Nordic Historians’ Conference on Historical Method 
(Nordiska historiska metodkonferenserna), specialized in questions on method 
and theory. Broadly speaking, the initiative to this new forum stemmed from 
the emergence of the post-WWII welfare states and the increasing importance 
of the social sciences, which threatened the traditional position of history as the 
leading academic discipline of the nation-state. Thus, Nordic historians joined 
forces to protect the integrity and importance of history as a discipline, eager 
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to clarify the relation between history and the social sciences (SIMENSEN; 
HELLAND 1984; ENGMAN 1991, p. 49; TORSTENDAHL 2000, p. 5–9). Moreover, 
other specialized forms of cooperation sprang up in various subfields. For 
instance, the Nordic Women’s and Gender Historians’ Conference (Nordiska 
Kvinnohistorikermötet) was launched in 1983. Initially, as the original Swedish 
title reveals, these conferences aimed at making women and their activities 
more visible in academic history-writing. In the late-1980s, this rather empirical 
mission was widened by critical self-reflection and a more theoretical approach 
on gender issues, whereas the novelty of the new millennium has been men’s 
history, inspired by critical studies on masculinities (HAAVET 2009).
Finally, closer cooperation among Nordic historians was encouraged by using 
research funding as an incentive. Although there had been some funds available 
for inter-Nordic research ever since the heyday of pan-Scandinavianism, the 
funding options for these purposes became firmly institutionalized after the 
establishment of the Nordic Council in 1952. A landmark in this respect was 
an agreement on the Nordic Cultural Fund, signed in 1966 to support cultural 
projects (including research) involving a minimum of three Nordic countries. 
The Nordic Cultural Fund was complemented by about a dozen bilateral funds 
in the Nordic region. In 1982, a great leap forward was taken by the Nordic 
Council as it decided to establish the Nordic Science Policy Council for enhancing 
co-operation among its member countries, soon followed by the establishment 
of the Nordic Academy of Advanced Study (NorFA). In the field of the humanities 
and the social sciences, the Joint Committee for Nordic Research Councils (NOS-
HS) started its work in 2004, launching its first call for Nordic collaborative 
research projects (NORDCORP) in 2008. In addition, NOS-HS has supported 
series of Nordic Exploratory Workshops to promote the development of new 
research areas and programs. In 2005, yet another Nordic research institution, 
the Nordic Research Board (NordForsk) was established, and the Nordic Science 
Policy Council as well as the Nordic Academy of Advanced Study were integrated 
into it. While the original programs of the latter had been reserved for researchers 
coming from the Nordic countries alone, the post-1989 conceptual enlargement 
of Norden was manifested in the fact that the current provisions of NordForsk 
were opened also to researchers and PhD students in the Baltic countries and 
Northwest Russia (MUSIAŁ 2009, p. 296–297).4
Despite all this toing and froing of historians across the Nordic region, those 
in favour of truly comparative or transnational research projects and publications 
have been left with a thing or two to desire. As several participants complained in 
the 21st Nordic Historians’ Conference on Historical Method (1989), the excellent 
opportunities for going beyond the national framework “were not used to the 
full extent possible.” More often than not, the regionalization of the present- 
-day Nordic countries was taken for granted, which resulted in a plethora of 
projects, publications, and presentations merely listing the distinctive features 
4 For information on the Joint Committee for Nordic Research Councils for the Humanities and the Social 
Sciences (NOS-HS), see http://www.nos-hs.org/prognett-nos-nop/Home_page/1253964310884.
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of various nationally-based case studies. Indeed, even today attempts to write a 
Scandinavian or Nordic history are often organized as “anthology comparisons,” 
where scholars from the national academies contribute from their distinctively 
nationalist perspectives, and the actual comparisons are left to the readers. 
Consequently, the attempts to write a Nordic history from a comparative or 
transnational perspective have mostly been made by scholars from outside the 
region (ENGMAN 1991, p. 48–52; KIRBY 1991, p. 10–11; see also HILSON 2008, 
p. 13–14). In some Nordic countries, particularly in Norway and Finland, the 
academic alternative to the national framework has rather been local history, and 
regional approaches have thus mostly been limited to the studies of intra-state 
micro-regions (see e.g. ARONSSON et al. 2008, p. 272; FORSKNINGSRÅDET 
2008, p. 114–121, 152–157).
Looking at the critical assessments of the Nordic historians’ conferences, the 
above notions are repeated. According to the historian Jarl Torbacke, well until 
the postwar era the participants of the Nordic Meetings of Historians generally 
expressed strong opposition even to common conference themes, not to mention 
cross- or trans-Nordic research projects that started to gain support no earlier than 
the late-1960s. Hence, the main function of the Nordic Meeting of Historians was 
to offer the historians a common platform where each of them could give a talk 
on his/her own separate national case-study (TORBACKE 2005, p. 57–58). The 
same can be said about the Nordic Historians’ Conferences on Historical Method. 
In addition to the general Nordic tendency for preferring empirical research to 
theoretical analysis, neither method nor theory united historians in one country 
or in the Nordic region as a whole. Instead, the methodological and theoretical 
choices mostly reflected the general international trends in the field of history 
without the emergence of a distinctive “Nordic school” of interpretation (KIRBY 
1991, p. 11; TORSTENDAHL 2000, p. 25).
To sum up, in addition to being a historical region, Norden certainly 
composes a historiographical region with long, well-established traditions of 
academic cooperation, but this sense of regional community is chiefly based on 
the assumption of the distinctiveness of each Nordic nation-state. As mentioned 
above, since the idea of a common Nordic identity has become to be built 
into what it means to be a Dane, Swede, Norwegian, Finn, or Icelander, much 
promoted “Nordicity” seems to reveal itself only through the nation-states. 
In a defense of the nation-centered Nordic historians, it can be acknowledged 
that the nation-states, however “imagined” and provisional they may be, do not 
fade away with a sheer effort of will of the historians. In the everyday realities 
of politics and culture of the twentieth century, they have played a central 
role – and still do, despite various globalization processes. This is especially 
true in the Nordic countries, where the post-WWII welfare regimes have been 
emphatically welfare states; in other words, based on the strong public sector 
with little room for the private sector, for philanthropic or voluntary provision, 
or for the family (see e.g. HILSON 2008, p. 90). Thus, instead of dismissing the 
nation-states as a nightmare from which we have only recently awoken, what 
is arguably needed is a critical, comparative approach to a history of national 
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historiographies, which also regards the interaction of national history-writing 
with national narratives of other countries as well as with the parallel processes 
of translocal connections, cultural transfers, and cross-fertilization.
In the history of Nordic historiography, genuinely comparative and 
transnational approaches are still relatively new phenomena. A pioneering 
study is the article “Nordic National Histories” (ARONSSON et al. 2008), which 
was written as a part of the five-year research program “Representations of 
the Past: The Writing of National Histories in 19th and 20th Century Europe” 
funded by the European Science Foundation. Here, four Nordic historians joined 
forces to offer one of the first overall views on Nordic nationalist history-writing. 
Another publication worth mentioning is The Cultural Construction of Norden, 
published already in 1997 as a product of cooperation between two research 
projects. In this volume, the focus was on the Nordic region-building and the 
parallel development of nationalism and Nordism in the Nordic countries (See 
SØRENSEN; STRÅTH 1997).
The research done so far indicates that behind the seemingly endless amount 
of national peculiarities, variations, and differences, there is also a number of 
important similarities and common basic assumptions. To some extent, we can 
thus outline a common view of the past, which has influenced the way the past is 
conceptualized in the Nordic countries in the present. For instance, in all Nordic 
countries the myth of a golden age of peasant freedom and equality plays a 
crucial role in national historiographies, tending to exclude the nobility from 
the people (folk), while simultaneously emphasizing the Lutheran clergy as an 
essential part of it (ARONSSON et al. 2008, p. 260, 263–264; see also STENIUS 
1997, p. 168–169). On the basis of this “grand narrative,” it has been argued in 
the sociological analysis of the Nordic welfare state that there exists a distinct 
Scandinavian route – a Nordic Sonderweg – to modern democracy, based on the 
system of peasant proprietorship and family farms (ALESTALO; KUHNLE 1987, p. 
8–13, 37; GÖTZ 2003a, p. 331). Within women’s and gender history, a related 
Nordic theme has been the idea of the “strong, hard-working, and independent 
Nordic woman,” which operates with the distinction between “our” welfare states 
that foster gender equality and the patriarchal systems of other European regions 
that oppress women (see e.g. MARKKOLA 1997; GORDON 2007).
To be sure, “the free Nordic peasant” and “the strong Nordic woman” are 
not entirely mythical creatures. In most parts of the Nordic region, except the 
continental Denmark, there were, indeed, comparatively speaking far fewer feudal 
traits than in much of the rest of Europe. Thus, there existed a degree of local 
self-governance by free-holding peasants who were also entitled to send their 
representatives to the assembly of four estates (in Swedish, Ståndsriksdagen 
or Rikets ständer) (See e.g. ÁRNASON; WITTROCK 2012, p. 10). In the case of 
women, it has been stated that due to the persistent agrarian character of Nordic 
societies, the spheres of men and women were largely overlapping until the 20th 
century, which restricted the modern bourgeois/urban division of the feminine 
private sphere and the masculine public sphere. This relatively undifferentiated 
state of affairs arguably paved the way for Nordic women to participate early on 
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in politics and working life (E.g. SULKUNEN 1987; HIILAMO 2006). Nevertheless, 
by highlighting different historical evidences, a different narrative is also possible. 
In an alternative version, the lack of feudal traits in Norden is mostly explained 
by the fact that the actual conditions of the Nordic peasants were so poor that 
a “feudal system proper” was unnecessary. In other words, there was no need 
to bind the peasants to the soil, since there was no place for them to escape 
(YLIKANGAS 1986, p. 52–57). In a similar vein, it has been argued that the social 
order placed – and still places – women in such a variety of positions in society 
that it is pointless to discuss a history of “the Nordic woman” in singular form, 
which calls into question not only a universal male subject, but also a universal 
female subject (SULKUNEN 1987; MARKKOLA 1997).
In the scope of this article, it is not possible to go into the details of the 
Nordic myths of “the free peasant” and “the strong woman.” Instead, the point 
I wish to make is that there is no path dependency between the past and the 
present and, therefore, no unbroken chain of events leading from the pre-modern 
agrarian monarchies to the post-WWII welfare states (see also HILSON 2008, 
p. 16; STRÅTH 2012, p. 31). Thus, when the Nordic historians prefer to detect 
continuity between the past and the present, it is always a matter of choosing 
some historical facts and leaving something else out of the story. Similarly, when 
they start discussing region-building, some subjects, phenomena, and epochs 
are privileged over others. In this sense, as Arif Dirlik puts it, the past is not just 
a legacy but also a project, and it is our duty as historians to ask ourselves what 
our project might be (DIRLIK 2005, p. 410).
Concluding Remarks
Whoever enters the domain of historical and historiographical regions 
should be aware of venturing into a vague and oscillating space, which offers no 
steady ground under one’s feet. As the “allnordisch” region-building of the Nazi 
regime poignantly shows, transnational or translocal regional conceptualizations 
are not necessarily more “enlightened” alternatives to national(ist) ones. More 
often than not, they are politically and ideologically loaded constructions that are 
inseparably interwoven into expansive, imperial, or nationalist projects. Thus, a 
transnational Nordic perspective on history and the history of historiography is not 
an alternative to methodological nationalism, but rather another dimension in the 
critical analysis of constructed and “imagined” identifications and communities. 
If we assume – as I recommend that we should do – that national and regional 
conceptualizations are, to a large extent, phenomena of discourse, there is very 
little room left for anything inherently “Nordic”. Instead, the emphasis then 
shifts to the construction and reproduction of Norden and Nordicity at distinctive 
junctures in time and place and the diverse purposes it serves. 
However, similar to the case of nation-states, the acknowledgement of 
historical regions as constructions does not mean that these constructions 
are not based on or do not work in “reality” in a material sense. As common 
historical experiences are based on the fact that the societies forming a historical 
region share certain principles, practices, and institutions, they may contribute 
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significantly to a common mentality and social relations. In the Nordic case, 
they contribute to a close interconnection of a strong civil society with a strong 
state, which has been manifested in a close cooperation between the state 
and the popular movements. Thus, in the similar manner as the geographers 
Kirsten Simonsen and Jan Öhman argue for a “Nordic” human geography 
(SIMONSEN; ÖHMAN 2003, p. 3–4), the analysis of Norden – or any other spatial 
unit – as a historical and historiographical region should try to combine social 
constructionism and the critique of essentialism with some kind of ontological 
realism that does not deny a certain construct validity, historical continuity, and 
concrete material influences of regional conceptualizations. The result would be 
a more self-reflective, self-critical awareness of how our own historical research 
relates to territorial demarcations and regional identifications that have often 
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